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Financing Public Health Through
Nonprofit Conversion Foundations
BY CHRISTOPHER W. FROST*
INTRODUCTION
p rotection and promotion of the public's health are typically thought
of as governmental responsibilities.' Certainly, the core functions
of responding to contagious diseases through quarantine, vector control,
mandatory reporting, mandatory immunizations, and other coercive
measures require governmental power. Historically, public health has been
defined by governmental response to immediate threats to the health of the
population.2
As our view of the public's health expands to take into account broader
measures, however, so too can we expand our view of the kinds of
institutions that serve to promote the public's health. Most commentators
agree that public health is a wide ranging discipline. Professor Lawrence
Gostin writes, "The mission of public health is broad, encompassing
systematic efforts to promote physical and mental health and to prevent
disease, injury, and disability."'3 While Gostin's focus is on the govern-
" Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Frost Brown Todd Professor of
Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A. 1983, J.D. 1986, University
of Kentucky. The author served as Special Counsel to Kentucky Attorney General
Albert B. Chandler I in Commonwealth v. Anthem Insurance Companies,
discussed in this Article.
Professor Lawrence Gostin's definition of public health law includes as an
essential characteristic his view that "[p]ublic health activities, are a special
responsibility of the government." LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, REsTRAINT 4 (2000).
2 See id. at 9-11 (discussing early public health efforts focused on "conditions
of travel at sea; isolation and quarantine; inoculation with smallpox pus; sanitary
controls on dead fish, animals, and garbage; and quality controls on bread, meat,
and drinking water"); see also Elizabeth B. Cooper, Social Risk and the
Transformation ofPublic Health Law: Lessons from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA
L. REv. 869,881-88 (2001) (providing a historical perspective on disease control).
3 GOSTIN, supra note 1, at 16.
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ment's role in promoting public health,4 there is nothing about contempo-
rary definitions of public health that exclude a role for the private,
nonprofit sector.
One cannot doubt the importance of nonprofit institutions in assuring
the conditions necessary for the health of the population. Nonprofit
organizations operate most of our hospitals, train health care professionals,
assure the supply of blood, and perform a myriad of other services that
provide the infrastructure necessary to the public's health. In addition, the
nonprofit form of organization enables health care organizations to provide
public health services that profit seeking organizations are unable to
maintain. Nonprofit hospitals provide education, indigent care, preventive
health services, prenatal care, and mental health care services that may not
be provided by for-profit organizations.5
Changes in health care financing and industry structure may substan-
tially reduce the contributions to public health that have traditionally been
made by nonprofit organizations. The rise of managed care and the ever
increasing reliance on expensive medical technologies have increased the
industry's need for capital,6 and changes in reimbursement formulas have
reduced nonprofits' ability to maintain the level of uncompensated and
poorly compensated services.7 At the same time, the changes have created
4 See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The Public Health Improve-
ment Process in Alaska: Toward a Model Public Health Law, 17 ALASKA L. REV.
77 (2000) (defining public health principally in terms of public health law).
5 Whether nonprofits meet this expectation is, however, subject to some doubt.
A recent review of empirical literature shows that nonprofits do provide a greater
amount of charity care and services that lose money. Div. of Health & Sci. Policy,
N.Y. Acad. of Med., The Empirical Literature Comparing For-Profit and
Nonprofit Hospitals, Managed Care Organizations, andNursingHomes: Updating
the Institute of Medicine Study (July 1999), available at http://wvw.cnhc.org/
Report3.pdf (visited Jan. 27,2002). Some commentators assert, however, that the
differences between for-profits and nonprofits are small. See David A. Hyman,
Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, andRegulatory Follies, 23 J. CORP. L. 741,
756-63 (1998).
6 See David M. Cutler & Jill R. Horwitz, Converting Hospitals from Not-For-
Profit to For-Profit Status: Why and What Effects? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, WorkingPaperNo. 6672, at 11-12, Aug. 1998), available at http:/Vvw.
nber.org/papers/w6672 (visited Dec. 12, 2001); Lawrence E. Singer, The
Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals' Changes
in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 221, 225-28 (1997).
7 See BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE
CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 335 (1991) ("Trying to
generate surplus patient revenues to finance money losing activities (so-called
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the opportunity for providers to generate profits necessary to support their
new capital requirements. The need for capital and the profits available to
support it have led to an increase in for-profit ownership of health care
facilities. For-profits have increased mainly through the acquisition of
assets of nonprofit organizations.
The late 1980s and 1990s have witnessed an increasing number of
nonprofit organizations converting to profit seeking ventures.8 This wave
of nonprofit conversions has sent states' Attorneys General and public
interest advocates scrambling to find ways to police these transactions.
High profile transactions involving Blue Cross/Blue Shield conversions
resulted in litigation involving billions of dollars that states claimed should
be set aside in charitable foundations devoted to health care. At the same
time, smaller transactions involving community hospitals, nursing homes,
and ambulance services are also attracting attention. Unfortunately, many
of these efforts have been hampered by inadequate conversion laws that
force states to regulate conversions on a post-hoc basis with antiquated
legal tools.
The conversion of health care assets from nonprofit to for-profit
ownership raises questions of particular concern to public health officials.
This shift in the health care industry requires that we examine whether the
for-profit form of organization can provide health care services in the most
economically efficient and efficacious manner, a debate which continues.
Perhaps of more direct concern for public health, the conversion of health
care assets also raises the question of the value of the nonprofit form to the
community as measured by charity care, services to Medicaid patients,
cross-subsidization of unprofitable units such as emergency rooms, health
education, preventive care, and other, more elusive community benefits that
may be lost in a conversion.
Assuming that nonprofit conversions will continue in the health care
arena, the challenge to policymakers is to capture and invest the proceeds
of such transactions in organizations that can replace the public health
functions of the nonprofit. This Article will discuss ways in which proceeds
from nonprofit conversions can be used by the nonprofit sector to continue
Robin Hood financing) has been made more difficult because of price competition
and increasingly stringent rate-setting policies, particularly by Medicare.").
Between 1970 and 1995,330 hospitals converted fromnonprofit to for-profit.
See Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 6, at table 2. Conversion activity peaked in 1996
before falling off in the late 1990s. See GRANTMAKERS IN HEALTH,
PHILANTHROPY'S NEWEST MEMBERS: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 SURVEY OF NEW
HEALTH FOUNDATIONS at 4 ex. 1 (1999).
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the public health services provided by nonprofit health care organizations.
An example can be found in the recent formation of The Foundation for a
Healthy Kentucky. This Foundation was established from a $45 million
settlement obtained through litigation by KentuckyAttorney General Albert
B. Chandler, III against Anthem Insurance Company over Anthem's 1993
merger with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kentucky. The Foundation is
designed to meet the public health care needs of the Commonwealth
through projects designed to influence health policy and improve access to
health care generally.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the law of nonprofit
conversions. The law governing nonprofit conversions is founded on
common law doctrines of charitable trust. In many states, the procedures
surrounding conversions are farther regulated by state statutes that provide
states' Attorneys General the tools they need to assure that the change in
ownership results in adequate proceeds that can replace the public benefits
lost in a conversion. Parts II and III provide a case study based on the
Kentucky Attorney General's litigation with Anthem Insurance Company.
Part H will focus on the difficulties in the lack of a regulatory structure
created in the Anthem case. Part I will discuss the process of forming the
Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky from the $45 million settlement of that
case. The Foundation's focus on health care policy activities aimed at
improving the health of all Kentuckians provides an example of one way
to capture some of the public health benefits of the nonprofit form of
organization.
I. THE LAW OF NONPROFIT CONVERSIONs
The activities of, and control over, nonprofit organizations are
governed by an amalgam of federal tax law, state trust law, and nonprofit
corporation statutes. As the number of conversions began to accelerate in
the early 1990s, officials charged with regulating nonprofits found these
legal tools inadequate to address the complexities in the organizations and
transactions. In response, many states have enacted nonprofit conversion
statutes that require buyers and sellers to provide advance notice to the
state's Attorney General and obtain prior approval of the deal. These
statutes permit the Attorney General to participate in the transaction while
it is in the formative stages rather than forcing him or her to litigate after
the fact. This section discusses the application of traditional common law
trust principles to nonprofit conversions and the emergence of statutory
approaches to the regulation of these transactions.
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A. The Theory ofNonprofit Conversions
For many, the term "nonprofit" conjures up images of traditional
charitable organizations like the Red Cross, or religious charities like the
Salvation Army. These organizations rely on donations from individuals
and corporations and carry on an explicitly charitable agenda. Commercial
nonprofits, such as nonprofit hospitals, HMO's, and Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans, do not fit the mold of these traditional charities. On the
surface, large commercial nonprofit organizations seem more like for-profit
corporations than charitable organizations. This similarity creates
substantial confusion when considering the question of how to manage the
conversion of assets from one organizational form to another. The
confusion also results from the fact that little may visibly change immedi-
ately after a conversion. The new for-profit organization will continue to
provide services and will continue to expect payment for those services.
Thus, at first blush, it may be hard to determine what precisely is at stake
in such transactions.
The confusion comes from a misunderstanding of the essential
attributes ofnonprofit organizations. Nonprofits are characterized by a lack
of identifiable owners rather than by their good works or reliance on
donations.9 The focus on ownership explains much about the law governing
nonprofit organizations. A hospital or educational institution operated by
a nonprofit organization may look like a for-profit competitor on the
surface, but, unlike the for-profit,'0 no individual or governmental entity
possesses the right to control, or profit from the nonprofit organization's
assets. More simply, nonprofits charge for service and can earn profits, they
just cannot pay out profits in the form of dividends.1
9 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980). Hansmann is the architect of the prevailing theory of nonprofit
organization, describing a nonprofit as "in essence, an organization that is barred
from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over
it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees." Id. at 838.
'0 Evelyn Brody concludes that,
[i]n comparing the organization and operations ofnonprofits in light ofhow
proprietary businesses function, we learned that the two sectors are much
more similar than conventionally believed. Firms, whether nonprofit or
proprietary (or even public), are subject to many of the same economic
forces, such as resource dependency, institutional isomorphism, and
organizational slack.
Evelyn Brody, Agents without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit andFor-Profit OrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. RPv. 457,535
(1996).
" See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 838 ("It should be noted that a nonprofit
organization is not barred from earning a profit. Many nonprofits in fact
2001-2002]
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Understanding nonprofits as a form of organization rather than by their
acts of charity provides insights into why nonprofits convert to for-profit
organization and how the law should regulate that conversion. For example,
consider a hypothetical hospital in a small to medium sized community.
The nonprofit corporation that owns the hospital is likely to be controlled
by a group of civic minded individuals who consider their role in the
hospital's management as a contribution to the well-being of the commu-
nity. They take pride in the fact that the hospital provides an emergency
room, some charity care, and other community services such as prenatal
care, stop-smoking clinics, reduced cost immunizations, and the like. The
nonprofit continues to operate the hospital because the trustees believe the
operation of a hospital is the best way to use the value of the organization's
assets for the betterment of the community.
The mere fact that the community needs a hospital does not, however,
say anything about who should own that hospital. A for-profit organization
that owned the hospital might run it more efficiently. 2 Concomitantly, the
fact that the nonprofit organization has substantial value does not mean that
that value should be invested in the hospital. The value of the hospital
might be put to better use if the assets were liquidated and the proceeds
were used to continue the services that the for-profit will not provide or,
perhaps, redirected to other activities that enhance the well-being of the
community.
Conversion transactions, on this view, are simply the method by which
a nonprofit can swap operating assets for financial assets when the change
results in net social benefits. 3 Presumably, a for-profit organization that
can run a hospital more efficiently than it is being run in the nonprofit form,
will be willing to pay the nonprofit more than the assets are worth to the
consistently show an accounting surplus. It is only the distribution of profits that
is prohibited.").
12 See Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital
Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1462 (1980) ("What the evidence on efficiency
does confirm is [that] ceterisparibus, managerial discretion (or 'slack') is greater
[in nonprofits] than in for-profits because of the absence of comparable capital-
market controls-that is, controls exerted by capital suppliers as opposed to
customers-and it results in organizational practices that increase the managers'
utility."). Beyond operating inefficiencies, Clark argues that, overall, the nonprofit
form imposes substantial costs on society. Id. at 1418.
13 See Singer, supra note 6, at 230 ("[T]he ability to secure a large pool of funds
through sale or conversion, which can then be used to enhance the welfare of the
community, presents an attractive alternative to continued ownership of an acute
care hospital.").
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community in the nonprofit organization. The most straightforward
paradigm and, in fact, the most common structure is that of a sale of the
operating assets by the nonprofit and the creation of a new foundation to
receive the proceeds. Through negotiation, the nonprofit board and the for-
profit organization should be able to reach a price that splits the efficiency
gains resulting from the transaction. 1"
Of course, this benign view of nonprofit conversions depends entirely
on the assumption that the parties to the transaction are both fully informed
about the consequences of the deal and have the correct set of incentives to
negotiate a deal that is both value maximizing and fair from a distributional
perspective. From a legal standpoint, the challenge is to develop regulatory
structures that assure that all of the interests affected by the transaction
have been represented by agents who share the incentives of their
principals.
General theories underlying transactions in the for-profit arena can
illuminate the issues arising in nonprofit conversions. For-profit corpora-
tion law focuses its regulatory efforts on the agency problems that inhere
in the separation of ownership from control. 5 Shareholders, as the owners
of the firm (the principals), are represented by a board of directors (the
agents) in the initial negotiation of a merger, sale or other acquisition. 6
Corporate fiduciary duty principles regulate the relationship between the
agents and their principals and allocate approval responsibility between
them. 7 Securities laws govern disclosure obligations so that the principals
are provided adequate information to make a decision regarding the
transaction." Governmental regulations, such as antitrust laws, protect the
interests of the public that would otherwise be unrepresented in the
transaction.
" See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 71-72
(1995).
5A seminal work discussing the agency problems in firm governance is Eugene
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 304 (1983).
16 Shareholders retain discretion over fundamental changes in the corporation
such as mergers, DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 251 (2001); R v. MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 11.01 (1984), the sale of substantially all of the assets of the corporation,
DEL. CODEANN. tit 8, § 271 (2001); REv.MODELBus. CORP.Acr §§ 12.01 -.02
(1984), and changes to the articles, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2001); REV.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 10.03 (1984).
7 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-141 (1986).
18 See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6-11 (3d
ed. 1996) (discussing the scope and coverage of federal and state securities
regulation).
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The law regulating nonprofit conversions could follow the same
general approach, but with one important difference. Because, the sine qua
non of nonprofits is the lack of an identifiable group of owners, nonprofit
conversions present the difficult question of how to resolve a principal-
agent problem when the principal is undefined. 9 Without a clearly defined
principal, the normal process of bargaining cannot reliably value the assets
sold and therefore cannot assure that conversion transactions increase net
social wealth.
As discussed below, charitable trust law, and more recent nonprofit
conversion statutes, provide a way to resolve this problem. Traditionally,
transactions involving assets that have been dedicated to a public purpose
(the hospital corporation conversion in our example) are regulated by the
courts in actions brought by the states' Attorneys General, exercising their
parenspatriae power.2 The managers ofthese assets, the board oftrustees,
serve as agents for the public, generally, and are answerable for failure of
that trust to the courts, specifically. The Attorney General's role is
necessary to assure that the public's interest, as principal, is adequately
represented.2'
Charitable trust law thus provides a mechanism to reduce the agency
problems inherent in nonprofit conversions. Standing in for the "owners"
19 See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 227, 271 ("Currently, charities remain
effectively uncontrolled due to the absence of traditional corporate controls from
the nonprofit form, such as shareholders and the market for corporate control.").20 See 4A AUsTIN WAKEMAN SCOTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, SCOTr
ON TRUSTS § 392 (4th ed. 1989); Singer, supra note 6, at 222.2 1 Manne suggests that the market might provide an alternative approach to the
resolution of the principal-agent problem by the creation of private for-profit
monitoring agencies that nonprofit organizations could hire to ensure that the
nonprofit fulfills its obligations to donors. The agency would act as a "private
attorney general" that would have standing to sue to enforce compliance with the
nonprofits obligations. Reassured by the presence of the monitor, donors would be
more likely to give. Manne, supra, note 19, at 248-57. Whatever the appeal of
Manne's proposal, it is unclear how it could work in a commercial nonprofit
conversion since these organizations do not rely heavily on donations. Further,
once the decision to convert the organization to the for-profit form is reached, the
nonprofit would have nothing to gain by hiring such a watchdog.
Brody also invokes the principal-agent problem in her analysis of nonprofits,
concluding that the ongoing need to satisfy constituencies alleviates some of the
agency problems caused by the lack of owners. See Brody, supra note 10, at 512-
35. Of course, Brody's analysis assumes that the nonprofit will continue in
existence, an assumption that does not hold in analyzing the problems created by
a nonprofit conversion.
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of the assets--the general public--the state Attorney General and court
can insist that the board negotiate a transaction that assures that the
public receives full value for the charitable assets transferred in the conver-
sion.22
Before examining the contours of charitable trust law in detail,
however, it is necessary to clear away some confusion that permeates many
discussions of charitable organizations. Although charitable organizations
exist for a "public purpose" and are closely regulated by the state, they are
forms of private ownership of property. Thus, the state does not have a
right to claim the proceeds of conversion transactions nor can state
legislatures interfere with the rights the trust creates.'3 Professor Fratcher
explains the rights and duties arising under a charitable trust as follows:
A trustee of a charitable trust is clearly under a duty properly to adminis-
ter the trust, but it is difficult to see who has the correlative right. The
duty can be enforced, as has been stated, in a proceeding brought by the
Attorney General, but the duty is not owing to him. It can hardly be said
that the duty is owing to the state. Certainly the state as such is not the
beneficiary of a charitable trust, except in rare cases; and it has been held
that the legislature has no power to destroy or to vary the terms of a valid
charitable trust. The truth seems to be that the trustee of a charitable trust
owes duties, but the duties are not owing to any person or persons in
particular, although they are enforceable at the suit of a public officer for
the benefit of the community.24
The theme of community dominates most of the cases arising from
nonprofit conversions. While the conversions involve assets held by the
nonprofit entity, it is clear that the community is the beneficiary of the
proceeds of the sale. Thus, much of the challenge in charitable conversions
is to assure that the proceeds resulting from the transaction benefit the
community whose interests in the operating assets were extinguished by the
conversion.
' Determining that value is a difficult proposition and beyond the scope of this
Article. For ourpurposes, it is enough to understand generally that the value of any
asset is the price which a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept
for the asset. In a nonprofit conversion, this determination requires that the for-
profit buyer assess the present value of the revenue stream the assets will generate
and that the nonprofit determine the present value of the services lost to the
nonprofit's beneficiaries. These amounts fix a maximum and minimum range of
efficient prices. The actual price should fall somewhere in between.
2 See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 20, § 348.
24Id
.
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B. Charitable Trust Law and Nonprofit Conversions
In addition to this concern for the community, much of the law of
charitable trust is designed to protect the expectations of donors. A
charitable trust is created through declaration of an intent to hold property
for the charitable purpose of the donor. The trust is a legal entity with the
power to hold, buy, and sell property, and is governed by a trustee or board
of trustees with a fiduciary duty to uphold the wishes of the donor. The
state protects the assets held by the trust and upholds the wishes of the
donor through actions by the state Attorney General brought in courts of
equity.25
One can conceptualize charitable trust law as creating a compact among
the donor, the trustee, and the state. The trustee, by accepting the assets,
assumes a duty to use the assets in accordance with the wishes of the donor.
The state agrees to protect this relationship through the courts as a way of
encouraging philanthropic endeavors. Without the assurance of this
protection, donors would be unlikely to give.26
The law of charitable trust not only protects the assets from falling into
private hands, but it also governs the post-conversion use of those assets.
As noted above, a charitable trust is an entity with general powers to buy,
sell, and use assets to advance the interests of the donors. Thus, a charitable
trust created to operate a hospital, for example, must ordinarily continue to
operate a hospital.
Changes in the charitable purpose are governed by the equitable
doctrine of cy pres, a french term meaning "as near[ly] as [possible]."'27
Under this doctrine, where the original charitable purpose is no longer
possible, a court of equity may approve an alternative use.28 As the
translation implies, the use chosen must generally be as close to the donor's
intent as possible.29
The regulation of nonprofit conversions under charitable trust law fits
within the agency rubric set out above. When a donor commits assets to a
' See id.
26 See Rob Atkinson, Reforming CyPres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1114
(1993) (characterizing the law of charitable trust, including cypres, as a bargain
between the state and the donor).27 BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 392 (7th ed. 1999).
28 See Atkinson, supra note 26, at 1115; Alex M. Johnson Jr. & Ross D. Taylor,
Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational
Contracts to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REv. 545, 561
(1989).
29 Atkinson, supra note 26, at 1115 (citingRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 399 (1957)).
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public use, he or she relies on the state to represent both the community's
interest in the funds and his or her own interest in the continuation of the
charitable purpose to which the assets are committed. The compact among
the donor, trustee, and state creates an agency relationship that will last
long after the donor is deceased.
While nonprofit conversions can be shoe-homed into the common law
of charitable trust, the doctrine was not intended to regulate contemporary
transactions involving complex commercial nonprofits such as those that
dominate the health care industry. The following discussion examines the
contours of charitable trust law as it applies to modem health care
transactions, highlighting the difficult issues the application of charitable
trust law raises.
1. The Basic Disconnect Between Charitable
Trust Rubric and Commercial Institutions
It is difficult to conceive of a modem hospital or insurance company as
being a charitable institution." Commercial nonprofits, such as those that
comprise the majority of the healthcare industry, charge for their services.
" The apparent disconnect between a law created hundreds of years ago to
govern specific bequests of property for the benefit of the poor and the modem
healthcare institution causes many commentators to conflate the tax exemption with
the claim that assets are held in charitable trust. See James J. Fishman, Checkpoints
on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the Conversion of Nonprofit
Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 J. CoRP. L. 701, 703 (1998)
(discussing 501(c)(3) organizations as "traditional nonprofits"); Eric S. Tower,
Directors'Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in the Conversion ofNonprofit Hospitals,
6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 157 n.1 (1997) (using the terms nonprofit and tax-exempt
interchangeably).
This tax-exemption perspective on nonprofit conversions is not wrong, but it
is incomplete. The Internal Revenue Code grants tax exemption under § 501(c)(3)
to organizations that are organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1995). These organizations are prohibited from engaging in activities that result
in inurement of the income of the organization to insiders, and the I.R.S. enforces
this prohibition in conversion transactions. See Fishman, supra, at 727-29. Not all
organizations holding charitable assets are tax-exempt, however. For example, in
1986, Congress withdrew the tax-exempt status of Blue Cross/Blue Shield
organizations. See Philip P. Bisesi, Conversion ofNonprofit Health Care Entities
to For-Profit Status, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 805, 818-20 (1997). In short, 501(c)(3)
status is likely to result in a finding that an entity holds its assets in charitable trust,
but 501(c)(3) status is not necessary to that determination.
2001-2002]
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While charity care and other charitable activities form a part of these
institutions' missions, they by no means dominate their day-to-day
activities. The near absence of any ongoing charitable mission may be a
significant factor in litigation seeking to capture the proceeds of the
transaction.
Nevertheless, the large nonprofit institutions that occupy the healthcare
industry started their lives as charitable institutions. At their inception,
hospitals were purely charitable institutions serving those too poor to afford
health care in their homes." As surgical techniques made possible by
advances in anesthesia and sterile procedures were developed, hospitals
began serving the population generally. Charitable hospitals' sponsorship
of Blue Cross organizations assisted the transition by providing the
hospitals with a steady stream of income and making possible hospital care
for the middle class.32
The challenge in conversion litigation is linking the two points in
history to show that all of the assets of the nonprofit are subject to the same
charitable trust that was created when the institution was conceived. The
key to establishing that link is the frame of reference of the founders of the
organization.33 When the initial founders created the organization, they
chose to contribute time, energy and capital to a venture for a public, as
opposed to their own personal, benefit. The fact that the venture grew and
became self-supporting through commercial endeavors does nothing to
change that original frame of reference.
Thus, the basic principles underlying charitable trust law govern the
scope of the assets to which the trust extends. The founders' decision to
organize the venture for the public's benefit deserves governmental
protection that extends to all of the assets that that organization acquired.
The organization's equity in the modem facilities and equipment and in the
intangible assets of the organization are all subject to the charitable trust
regardless of whether they were acquired through donation or through the
accumulation of profit. 4 By defining the charitable trust as all of the
entity's assets, the law requires a valuation of the entire entity to determine
3' GRAY, supra note 7, at 63-65.
32 See ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES:
A HISTORY OF THE BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 3-32 (1997).
33 See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 20, § 348 ("A charitable trust ... is
created because a person having power to create it has manifested by his words or
conduct an intention to create it.").
34 See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Ct. App.
1977) (stating that nonprofit corporate assets are impressed with a charitable trust
by articles of incorporation).
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whether the proceeds paid by the new for-profit owners are sufficient to
compensate the trust for the operating assets transferred3
The articles of incorporation and nonprofit corporation laws under
which the nonprofit was organized provide a basis for the argument that the
assets of commercial nonprofit organizations are held in a charitable trust. 6
Usually the articles of incorporation of the nonprofit make reference to the
public benefit purpose of the founders who organized the entity. 7 In
addition, older nonprofit corporations were organized under statutes that by
their terms govern "religious, charitable and educational institutions."38
Modem nonprofit corporation statutes require the corporation to distribute
its assets upon dissolution to another nonprofit that will carry on the public
benefit purpose found in the articles of the dissolved corporation. 9 These
11 See Fishman, supra note 30, at 718-21 (discussing valuation issues and
problems); see also infra notes 72-74, 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing
nonprofit conversion statutes and valuation).
36 See Queen of-Angels Hosp., 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39.37 REV. MOD. NONPROFI" CORP. ACT § 2.02(a)(2) (1987) requires that a non-
profit corporation include one of three statements in its Articles of Incorporation:
"(i) This corporation is a public benefit corporation.
(ii) This corporation is a mutual benefit corporation.
(iii) This corporation is a religious corporation."
The Act carefully distinguishes between the three types of organizations. For our
purposes, the most important distinction is between a public benefit corporation
and a mutual benefit corporation. Both types of organizations are "nonprofit,"
however, only the public benefit corporation holds its assets in charitable trust.
Mutual benefit corporations are member-owned entities that may distribute assets
to the members. See id. § 13.02(a) (permitting mutual benefit corporations to
purchase its memberships), § 14.06(7) (permitting mutual benefit corporations to
make distributions upon dissolution).
38 See CARROLL'S KENTUCKY STATUTES §§ 879-83 (1936) (setting out pro-
visions governing "Religious, Charitable and Educational Institutions").39 Where the articles or bylaws of a nonprofit public benefit corporation do not
specify a successor for the corporation's assets on dissolution, the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act requires that the assets be distributed to one or more
501(c)(3) organizations or, if the dissolved corporation itself is not a 501(c)(3)
organization, to one or more public benefit or religious corporations. REv. MOD.
NONPROFiT CORP. Acr § 14.06(a)(6) and Official Comments. The Comments make
clear that the assets cannot be distributed to members of the organization unless
they are public benefit organizations.
Here again, the Model Act draws a distinction between mutual benefit
nonprofits and public benefit nonprofits. Mutual members are entitled to receive
assets on liquidation. Id. § 14.06(a)(7) and Official Comments.
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provisions are an indication of the intent of the founders that the corpora-
tion holds its assets in charitable trust.
In specific cases, however, nonprofit corporation statutes and articles
of incorporation may fail to provide a clear picture of the intent of the
founders to create a charitable trust. Nonprofit corporation law is often
described as the step-child of corporate law4 -- developing haphazardly
over the years with little thought paid to transactions that might affect the
corporation long into the future. Changes in the legal structure governing
nonprofit corporations, articles of incorporation, and the actual operations
of the nonprofit over the years may obscure the original intent of the
founders to create a charitable trust. As a result, Attorney General
representation of the public and donor interests in the organization is often
subject to challenge regarding the charitable status of the nonprofit.4'
2. Enforcing the Compact:
Cy Pres and the Charitable Purpose of the Donor
The charitable trust doctrine of cypres governs the use to which the
proceeds must be put at the conclusion of the conversion transaction. The
theory behind this application of the doctrine is that the conversion
transaction represents a release of charitable assets from the entity where
the specific use, operating a hospital, for example, is no longer the best way
of accomplishing the donors' charitable purpose. The transaction provides
liquidity for the entity, permitting direct funding of its charitable purpose.
Cypres regulates this redeployment of the charitable trust's assets so that
the original purpose of the donor is maintained.
The courts' application of the cypres doctrine in health care conver-
sions is characterized by tension between the need to protect the interests
of the beneficiary and the desire of health care policy advocates to redeploy
the value of the charitable assets to address current needs. For example, in
Queen ofAngels Hospital v. Younger,42 the Franciscan Sisters of the Sacred
'o James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 657 (1985) (quoting Henn & Boyd,
Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organizations: California, Here We
Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1103, 1104 (1981)).
41 See infra Part II.A for an example of the difficulties created by this lack of
clarity.
42 Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct App. 1977). For
a further discussion of this case and other cy pres cases involving health care
organizations, see Michael W. Peregrine, Charitable Trust Laws and the Evolving
Nature of the Nonprofit Hospital Corporation, 30 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 11
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Heart, the unincorporated religious order that ran Queen of Angels
Hospital, filed a declaratory judgment action against the California
Attorney General seeking a determination of the validity of a lease of the
hospital assets to a for-profit hospital corporation. The lease was to run for
twenty-five years with two ten-year renewal options and required the for-
profit to make guaranteed rental payments to the lessor of $800,000 for the
first two years and $1,000,000 thereafter.43
Queen of Angels intended to use most of the lease proceeds to establish
and operate medical clinics in Los Angeles that would provide free medical
care to the poor.' The California Attorney General challengedthe proposed
lease and use of proceeds on the ground that the hospital's articles of
incorporation imposed a charitable trust that required that the assets be used
for the primary charitable purpose of operating a hospital.4"
The court agreed that all of the assets of the hospital were subject to a
charitable trust "by virtue of the express declaration of the corporation's
purposes."'46 Thus, the articles of incorporation determined the proper uses
of the assets. Upon examination of the articles, the court concluded that
Queen of Angels Hospital Corporation "was intended to and did operate a
hospital and cannot, consistent with the trust imposed upon it, abandon the
operation of the hospital business in favor of clinics."'47 The court then
turned to the hospital's argument that the use of the proceeds of the lease
to operate clinics serving the poor was as worthwhile as the operation of a
hospital. The court was willing to assume that the operation of clinics
would be a desirable purpose for a charitable corporation,48 but because the
articles of incorporation imposed a trust on the assets the court stated, "the
issue is not whether the new and different purpose is equal to or better than
the original purpose, but whether that purpose is authorized by the
articles."'49
(1997).
41 Queen ofAngels Hosp., 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
4Id.
4 Id. The parties did not dispute that "a 'hospital' is not the functional equiv-
alent of an 'outpatient clinic.' "Id.
4Id. (quoting Pac. Home v. County of Los Angeles, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal.
1953)).
471d. at 41.
48Id.
" Id. While this case, like many cases, revolved around provisions of the
articles of incorporation which set forth the corporate purpose ofthe nonprofit, the
court utilized cypres concepts in its ruling. See also Holt v. Coil. of Osteopathic
Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964).
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The Queen of Angels court's application of the cy pres doctrine
illustrates the tension inherent in charitable trust law. A restrictive
interpretation of the trust's purposes may unduly limit the trustee's ability
to apply the trust assets to the most pressing social needs."0 The socially
optimal use of charitable assets can be expected to change from generation
to generation and a liberal approach to cypres may be necessary to assure
that the assets are deployed where'most needed.51 Health care advocates
may find this liberal approach beneficial given the fast paced changes in
modem health care.
Not all states apply the cypres doctrine with equal force where the n ,nprofit
is organized as a nonprofit corporation. Some jurisdictions hold charitable
corporations to a lesser "quasi cypres" standard and only apply pure cypres t9 will
bequests. See Holden Hosp. Corp. v. S. III. Hosp. Corp., 174 N.E.2d 793 (111. 1961)
(board of directors must show that the proposed distributees carry on "substantially
similar" activities as the transferor). In Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization of
New York, Inc. v. New York City Chapter, Multiple Sclerosis Society, 505 N.Y.S.2d
841, 845 (1986), the Court of Appeals of New York stated:
[T]he Legislature did not intend the stringent "as near as possible" standard
of the common law to govern distribution of assets of a dissolving
charitable corporation received other than through a will or other limiting
instrument, but rather provided for distribution to corporations or
organizations engaged in substantially similar activities and left it to the
board of directors in the first instance to determine to whom distribution
should be made.
'0 Perhaps the most notorious example of this restriction is the Buck Trust case.
Mrs. Buck died in 1975 leaving a large estate in a foundation designed to benefit
the needy of Marin County, California. Soon after Mrs. Buck died, the stock in the
foundation increased dramatically in price due to a corporate acquisition. In fact,
by 1985, the trust had grown from a value of $9.1 million to a value of $380 to
$400 million-all to be spent in Main County, a county with the second highest
per-capita income in the country.
Perhaps spurred on by the difficulty of finding poor in Main County who
needed the help of the trust and perhaps motivated by a desire to help fund social
services in surrounding but less affluent counties, the San Francisco Foundation,
trustee of the Buck Trust, filed an action seeking a cypres determination loosening
the terms of the trust The court denied relief and the San Francisco Foundation
resigned as trustee and the Main County limitation remained intact. See Evelyn
Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L.
REv. 873,880 (1997); John G. SimonAmericanPhilanthropy and theBuckTrust,
21 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 658-60 (1987); Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing theDeadHand's
Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REv. 635
- (1988).
51See Atkinson, supra note 26, at 1112; Johnson & Taylor, supra note 28, at
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On the other hand, an approach to cypres that permits liberal departures
from the intent of the donors or nonprofit corporation founders raises moral
issues regarding the obligation of the state to abide by its agreements. 2
Perhaps more compelling is the argument that a failure to adhere closely to
the donor's intent may affect the willingness of the donors to give.53 Thus, the
traditional view of cy pres is that it forces a court to balance the need to
respond to changes in the socially optimal use of charitable funds against the
desire to maximize protection of the donor's intent.'
The strictness with which a court views the cypres doctrine may also
be a function of other values. One of the traditional requirements for cy
pres is that the original purpose of the donor have been frustrated.55 This
may be difficult to show in the case of a nonprofit conversion. In many
cases the conversion of a nonprofit health care provider to a for-profit
organization is not due to the fact that the continued operation of the
hospital is impossible. In fact, in most cases the hospital will continue to be
operated by the for-profit organization. Instead, the justification for
conversions is that the hospital assets might better be operated by the for-
profit organization, leaving the nonprofit organization to pursue other
objectives.56
52 See Atkinson, supra note 26, at 1121; Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting
"DonorIntent" in Charitable Foundations: Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes
Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 665, 692 (1997).
53 Abbinante, supra note 52, at 699 ("Without control over their charity, some
philanthropists would decrease their level of giving.").
' Of course, as Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, donors are unlikely to
intend to make useless gifts and would therefore welcome the intervention of courts
if the purposes for which they made their gift were frustrated by an unforeseen
contingency. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 556 (5th ed.
1998). Thus, on Posner's view, the dilemma presented by the cypres doctrine is a
false one.
Jonathan Macey, however, contests the notion that the settlor of the trust cannot
draft a trust instrument that anticipates unforeseen contingencies and provides for
alternative uses. See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trustsfor the Provision ofPrivate
Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 303-06 (1988).
" See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 28, at 561-62:
Most courts employ a three-part test to determine if cypres modification is
proper. To be successful, an applicant must show: first, there is a valid
charitable trust; second, the settlor's specific charitable objective is
frustrated, necessitating cy pres modification to carry out the settlor's
wishes; and third, the settlor's "general charitable intent" is not restricted
to the precise purpose identified in the trust instrument.
56 Singer recognized this problem, writing, "In states whose courts follow a
strict construction approach, conversion proceeds may be required to be dedicated
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Thus, a court that views with suspicion the claim that for-profit
ownership of health care organizations is at least equivalent to, if not better
than, nonprofit organizations may insist on exacting proof that the
conversion and consequent application of the cy pres doctrine is a last
resort. At least one commentator has suggested that states that have taken
the view that health care is best conducted in the nonprofit setting may be
more likely to rely on charitable trust principals in reviewing conversions
and other fundamental corporate transactions.57 The Queen of Angels
decision may be a case in point.58 By strictly applying cypres principals to
the nonprofit corporation, the court prohibited a transaction that may have
provided an overall benefit to the health of Los Angeles residents.
In agency terms, cypres presents the Attorney General and the court
with the challenge of defining the principals whose interests they must
protect. To say that the assets are "owned" by the public and dedicated to
a particular purpose by the donor is to recognize the potential for conflict
between the public's desire to use the assets in a particular way and the
donor's interest in controlling the assets after they are conveyed. Strict
application of the cypres doctrine recognizes the primacy of the donor's
purpose over the immediacy of current public interest on the assumption
that the donor-perhaps long since deceased-has a continuing interest in
a particular application offands. Whether the doctrine is suitable to modem
times and modem problems is subject to considerable doubt.
3. Charitable Trust Law and Problems of Process
Perhaps the most intractable problem with relying on charitable trust
principles to resolve the agency problems inherent in nonprofit conversions
is that the process of litigating these claims is not well suited to the type of
transactions the doctrine is intended to regulate. On the surface, conversion
transactions have all of the earmarks of large mergers and acquisitions in
the for-profit arena. These are complex transactions with complex terms
negotiated by individual board members who may not have the expertise to
strike the best bargain for the public. Representation of the public occurs
only at the back end of the transaction long after the parties have hammered
out the details of the deal and often after the transaction has been consum-
mated.
to the operation of a nonprofit hospital, the very entity whose sale, presumably
because of a well thought out purpose or need, generated the proceeds." Singer,
supra note 6, at 239 n.1 14.57 See Peregrine, supra note 42, at 19.58See id.
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In addition, while litigation is a useful process under which to deter-
mine discrete facts and their application to legal principles, it is unlikely to
be well suited to the kinds of multi-dimensional problems that a corporate
transaction is likely to entail. The kind of fact finding and rulemaking that
dominates the judicial process is fundamentally inconsistent with the give
and take of the deal-making process.
Notwithstanding these limitations, charitable trust enforcement is
inherently a judicial responsibility. Certainly, the donors and the public
intend the court to force the state and the trustees to uphold their end of the
charitable trust bargain. The challenge, then, is to develop a process under
which the general principles underlying the law of charitable trust can be
reconciled with the demands of the modem corporate transaction. The
following discussion examines recent state statutory enactments designed
to meet this challenge.
C. Nonprofit Conversion Statutes
As the pace of health care conversions increased during the late 1990s,
states, led by Nebraska59 and California,' began enacting legislation
designed to regulate these transactions. As of February 1998, twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia had enacted nonprofit conversion acts,6'
basing their statutes on the Nebraska and California models and on models
developed by the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG")62
and Consumers Union and Community Catalyst.' These statutes apply to
any agreement or transaction in which a nonprofit health care entity trans-
59NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-20,102 to 71-20,113 (1996). Nebraska was the first
state to enact such legislation.
60 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5913-5919 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001).
61 James D. Standish, Hospital Conversion Revenue: A Critical Analysis of
Present Law and Future Proposals to Reform the Manner in Which Revenue
Generated from Hospital Conversions is Employed, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 131, 143 (1998).62 See MODEL ACT FORNONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONvERSION TRANSACTIONS
[hereinafter NAAG PROPOSAL] and COMMENTARY TO THE PROPOSED MODEL ACT
FOR NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONVERSION TRANSACTIONS [hereinafter NAAG
COMMENTARY] (Nat'l Ass'n ofAtty's Gen. 1998), available at http://www.naag.
org/naag/resolutions/res-sum98-healthcare..conv.pdf (visited Jan. 28, 2002).
63AMODELACT [hereinahtrCONSUMERS UNION/COMMuNrrY CATALYST PRO-
POSAL] (Consumers Union/Community Catalyst 1998), available at http://www.
communitycatorg/acrobat/ModelConLeg.pdf (visited Jan. 28, 2002).
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fers ownership or control over a "material amount" of assets' of the
nonprofit to a for-profit entity,6" and provide a process in which parties to
nonprofit conversions must seek approval from the state Attorney General
and other officials charged with supervision of health care entities. 6 In
general, the statutes seek to systematize the application of the charitable
trust principles by requiring a showing that the nonprofit will receive fair
value for the assets, that no individual will receive a private benefit from
the transaction, and that the proceeds will be applied to a charitable purpose
that is generally consistent with the founder's or donor's intent. The
following discussion provides an overview67 of nonprofit conversion
legislation and discusses how these statutes are consistent with the
principles underlying charitable trust law.
In keeping with the notion that the assets of the nonprofit are held in
charitable trust for the benefit of the public, nonprofit conversion statutes
require an open process with full disclosure both to the Attorney General
and to the public. The statutes generally require that the disclosure include
all information that. the Attorney General determines is required68 and
require the Attorney General to provide the public with access to the
documents.69 The Nebraska statute also requires that the application include
64 See NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 1.02; CONSUMERS UNION/COM-
MuNrrY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, § l(a)(2); CAL. CORP. CODE §
5914(a)(1)(B). The Nebraska statute is more specific, applying to transactions
resulting in a change of ownership or control of twenty percent or more of the
assets of the nonprofit or to transactions resulting in the buyer holding fifty percent
or more of the assets or control of a nonprofit. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,
103(3).
65 California also regulates the transfer of assets between nonprofit corpora-
tions. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5920.
" Nebraska, for example, requires that the transaction be approved by the
Department of Health and Human Services Regulation and Licensure. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-20,104.
67 Comprehensive surveys of nonprofit conversion statutes are available. See
Standish, supra note 61; Volunteer Trustees, The Sale and Conversion of Not for
Profit Hospitals: A State by State Analysis of New Legislation, available at
http://www.volunteertrustees.org/hospitals/toc.html (visited Jan. 27, 2002).
6NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 2.02; CONSUMERS UNION/COMMUNITY
CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, § l(e); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5914(b).69 See, e.g., CONSUMERS UNION/COMMUNITY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note
63, § 2. Public scrutiny of proprietary information is a sensitive issue with business
organizations, however. The NAAG Act and commentarymakes explicit reference
to the fact that some documents may be subject to confidential treatment under
state open records laws. See NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 8.01. The
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a financial and economic analysis from an independent expert or consultant
regarding the effect of the transaction." Public input into the effects of the
proposed transaction is facilitated by provisions requiring a public hearing
prior to the approval of the transaction.7'
Nonprofit conversion statutes also provide procedural and substantive
standards that the transaction must meet prior to approval. Each of the
statutes requires that the selling nonprofit receive a fair and reasonable
value for the assets.7' Most of the statutes provide that the Attorney General
may hire experts in the valuation of health care assets to assist in this
determination.73 The statutes also prohibit private inurement to any person
as a result of the transaction.74
In addition to requiring a buyer to pay a fair price for the assets, many
nonprofit conversion statutes require the Attorney General or other state
official to consider the impact of the transaction on health care in the
affected community. The Consumers Union/Community Catalyst Proposal,
for example, requires the Attorney General to "determine the effect the
proposed transaction will have on the availability and accessibility of health
care services to the affected community and the for-profit's ability to
maintain and improve health access, quality of services, and coverage." 75
This proposal also requires that the for-profit demonstrate a commitment
to provide health care to the uninsured and underinsured and to provide
other benefits to the affected community which is at least comparable to the
commentary provides, however, that "the use of the confidentiality treatment
should be closely scrutinized." NAAG COMMENTARY, supra note 62, at 4.
71 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,104.
71 SeeNAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 4.01; CONSUMERS UNION/COMMUNITY
CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, § 2(e); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5916; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-20,106.
72 See NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 5.01(1); CONSUMERS UNION/COM-
MUNITY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, § 3(a); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(c);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(5).73 See NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 7.01 - 04; CONSUMERS UNION/
COMMUNITY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, § 5(d); CAL. CORP. CODE §
5919; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(5). The Nebraska statute also requires that an
evaluation by an independent expert be provided in the application itself. Id. § 71-
20,104.
74 See NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 5.01(6); CONSUMERS UNION/
COMMUNrrY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, § 3(d); CAL. CORP. CODE §
5917(b).
75 CONSUMERS UNION/COMMUNITY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63, §
4(a).
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commitment of the nonprofit.76 Nebraska and the NAAG Proposal include
a similar requirement but also provide that the continued activities of the
selling nonprofit or successor foundation must be considered in determin-
ing whether the requirement is met.77
Because of the uncertainty involved in the valuation process, nonprofit
conversion statutes also require close scrutiny of the process under which
the transaction was negotiated. While the requirements of the process are
variously stated, the statutes generally require the Attorney General to
examine whether the nonprofit has exercised due diligence in the negotia-
tion of the transaction7 and whether the transaction will result in a breach
of trust79 or undisclosed conflict of interest.8" Whether the transaction was
subjected to any market process is also an important consideration. The
NAAG Commentary states, "Special attention should be paid where there
has been no effort to market the charitable assets widely to insure
maximum return."8 These provisions incorporate the agency principles
underlying charitable trust law in an effort to ensure that the nonprofit
board negotiating the transaction fulfilled their fiduciary duty to the public
in the negotiation of the deal.
The statutes also incorporate the general principles underlying the cy
pres doctrine by requiring that the proceeds of the transaction continue to
be held in trust for a purpose consistent with that of the nonprofit.82 The
761 Id. § 4(a)(1).
77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,109(2); see also NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62,
§ 5.02(3) (providing a similar standard). The Nebraska statute is more consistent
with the general theory of nonprofit conversions set forth in this Article than is the
Consumers Union/Community Catalyst Proposal. As discussed above, nonprofit
conversions permit a release of charitable assets with the proceeds dedicated to
continuing the community benefits provided by the nonprofit. See supra notes 12-
14 and accompanying text. The assumption is that the for-profit owner of the
operating assets will behave as a for-profit behaves and that, therefore, the
purchase price of the assets should reflect the value lost in continuing public
benefits. The Consumers Union/Community Catalyst Proposal attempts to force the
for-profit to behave in a manner that may be inconsistent with private ownership
while at the same time forcing the for-profit to pay full value for the nonprofit's
assets. Arguably, this approach may result in double payment for the assets.78 See, e.g., NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 5.01(5); NEB. REV. STAT. §
71-20,108(2).79 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(f).80 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(4).
81 NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, at 8.
82 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(8); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(e).
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Consumers Union/Community Catalyst Proposal also provides detailed
provisions governing the charitable organization receiving the proceeds.
These provisions require the successor to remain independent of the for-
profit buyer, 3 require procedures under which the successor's board and
managers will avoid conflicts of interest,' 4 require that the successor be
"dedicated to serving the state's unmet health needs[,] '"' and require that
the successor be "broadly based in the affected community." 6 This
approach requires the foundation or other successor holding the proceeds
to recognize the general intent of the donors or founders while at the same
time permitting flexibility in the use of the proceeds to meet contemporary
needs.8 7
Perhaps the principal advantage ofnonprofit conversion statutes is that
they provide specific authorization for the Attorney General to examine the
details of a nonprofit conversion on the front end of the transaction. The
pre-transaction notice requirements and provisions for public input assure
that the transaction is not concluded in secrecy and that the Attorney
General will discharge his or her duty to protect charitable assets. While the
process necessarily involves some transaction costs, 8 there are substantial
benefits. The for-profit buyer is provided assurance that the transaction will
not be later challenged and the public, including those directly interested
in the nonprofit organization, is provided assurance that the charitable
assets are protected and applied to the health care needs of the community.
As discussed below, the alternative-post-transaction litigation in which
the Attorney General seeks to recover charitable assets-is costly and
creates uncertainty for all of the parties.
II. LITIGATING A NONPROFIT CONVERSION:
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. ANTHEM INSURANCE COMPANIES
On October 22, 1997, Kentucky Attorney General Albert B. Chandler,
III filed suit challenging a 1993 merger of Anthem and Kentucky's Blue
8 See CONSUMERS UNION/COMMUNITY CATALYST PROPOSAL, supra note 63,
§ 3(i).
T4 See id. § 3G).
85 Id. § 3(k).
8 Id. § 3(I); see also NAAG PROPOSAL, supra note 62, § 5.01(9):87 See supra Part I.B.2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cypres
doctrine and the charitable intent of the donors.
88 See Mark Krause, Comment, "First Do No Harm:" An Analysis of the
NonprofitHospitalSaleActs, 45 UCLAL. REV. 503,552-68 (1997) (criticizingthe
California and Nebraska statutes and providing other possible ways of regulating
nonprofit conversions in the health care industry).
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Cross and Blue Shield organizations ("Kentucky Blue"). 9 The gravamen
of the action was that the merger enabled Anthem, an Indiana for-profit
mutual insurance company, to convert charitable assets of Kentucky Blue
to private useY° From the beginning, the action was vigorously challenged
by Anthem, which claimed that judicial, legislative, and executive decisions
precluded the Attorney General from bringing the suit.9 ' In addition
Anthem claimed that Kentucky Blue was never a charity because it did not
receive donations and did not directly provide benefits to the poor.92 After
the trial court denied Anthem's preclusion defenses,93 the suit was settled
for $45 million.94
Although the Anthem litigation did not result in a published judicial
opinion, the claims and defenses raised in the case provide a good
illustration of fundamental issues arising in conversion litigation. Anthem's
claim that Kentucky Blue was a business enterprise and not a charity
presents the challenge of linking a large commercial entity with its
charitable roots. Anthem's preclusion claims raised the question of whether
government agencies have the authority to permit the subversion of the
charitable purpose of the founders of the organization through withdrawal
of tax exemption, legislation, or executive action. The difficult issues
encountered in the Anthem litigation were exacerbated by the fact that
89 Complaint, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler H
v. Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin
Circuit Court, Div. I (filed Oct. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Complaint].
901d. 103 ("The merger of Southeastern Mutual Insurance Company with and
into Anthem unjustly converted non-profit assets to for-profit use").
91 Answer, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler III v.
AnthemIns. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin Circuit
Court, Div. I (filed Dec. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Answer] at m, IV, VI and V.
92 See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts
I, II, and III, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler HI v.
Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566, Commonwealth ofKentucky, Franklin Circuit
Court, Div. I (filed June 17, 1998) [hereinafter Anthem Memoranda] at 3 ("Other
substantive deficiencies in the Commonwealth's charitable trust claims-such as
the fact that [Kentucky Blue] never received donations or provided free
benefits-will not require the Court's attention if this motion is granted.").
93 Order, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler I v.
Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-0 1566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin Circuit
Court, Div. I (entered May 5, 1999) [hereinafter Anthem Order].
94 Order, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler I v.
Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-0 1566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin Circuit
Court, Div. I (entered Dec. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Settlement Order].
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Kentucky does not have a statutory scheme governing nonprofit conver-
sions.9°
A. Blue Cross/Blue Shield as a Charitable Entity
Perhaps the most basic hurdle Attorney General Chandler faced was
Anthem's challenge to the assertion that Kentucky Blue held its assets in
charitable trust for the benefit of the public. At first blush, the charitable
nature of the organization appeared counterintuitive. Kentucky Blue was
a large commercial enterprise that could attribute its substantial reserves to
the success of its core health insurance business. The vast majority of its
assets were not donated but instead were accumulated earnings-the excess
of policy proceeds over reimbursements.
Even before General Chandler filed suit, Anthem began a public
relations blitz challenging the charitable trust claims and accusing Chandler
and consumer groups supporting the claims of trying to confiscate assets of
a private business and its policyholders.96 Advertisements and letters
appeared soon after the suit claiming that the suit would result in higher
premiums. 7 The advertisements prompted state insurance regulators to
demand that Anthem prove its claim under regulations prohibiting
"deceptive and misleading" advertising." Kentucky Insurance Commis-
sioner George Nichols, concluded that the advertisements were misleading
and reprimanded Anthem but failed to require that Anthem retract the ads.99
95See supra Part I.C for a discussion of nonprofit conversion statutes.
96 See Jim LeMaster, Anthem:No 'Ransom 'Due for Legal Merger, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), June 29, 1997, at E3; Anthem: A Mutual
Insurance Company, COURIER JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), May 5, 1997, atA8 (op-
ed columns written by the President of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Kentucky Operations); Angela Muhs, Anthem is Asked to Prove Claims in Ads,
Letters, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Oct 30, 1997, at Al, A4
(discussing advertisements and letters to policyholders contending that the suit
would lead to higher insurance premiums and reduced policyholder security if
successful).97 Muhs, supra note 96, at Al, A4 (discussing advertisements and letters to
policyholders contending that the suit would lead to higher insurance premiums and
reduced policyholder security if successful).
9 Id.; see also Patrick Howington, More Evidence Demanded to BackAnthem
Ads, COURIER JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 29, 1997, at El (discussing
Kentucky Department of Insurance view that Anthem had not provided sufficient
information).
99 Susan Fernandez, Anthem Ad Series is Found Misleading, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), May 8, 1998, at B4. Commissioner Nichols'
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In both its advertising and in the litigation, Anthem focused on the lack
of substantial donations and specific acts of charity in the recent history of
Kentucky Blue.' Anthem claimed that it was a commercial enterprise
locked in "cutthroat competition" with other insurance companies.' 1 '
Anthem further asserted that these facts showed that Kentucky Blue, like
Anthem itself, was a mutual company,2 owned by policyholders, and that
the merger did not convert charitable assets to private use.'0 3
General Chandler responded that the history of the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield movement nationally as well as the specific history of the formation
of Kentucky Blue indicated the founder's intent to organize Kentucky Blue
as a nonprofit entity with its assets held in charitable trust. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans were created by nonprofit charitable hospitals in the
1930s as a method of funding their operations.'" The inability of people to
pay for health care services threatened the existence of charitable hos-
decision not to require a retraction was met with sharp criticism from General
Chandler and Consumers Union. Id.; see also Michael Quinlan, State Says
Anthem's Ads Misled Consumers, COURIER JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), May 8,
1998, at Cl.
10' Robert T. Garrett, State, Anthem Argue Over Blue Cross Assets, COURIER
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 4,1999, atB3 (quoting Anthem attorney Gregory
Haynes as saying, "There were no charitable donations, [Blue Cross] never
provided free insurance.').
'O0 Patrick Howington, Once Tax-Exempt Blue Cross is Now Told It's Payback
Time, COURIER JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 20, 1997, at Al (quoting James
T. Parker, Anthem's vice president for external relations and corporate marketing,
as saying, "This is not the United Way. This isn't people dedicating their volunteer
time. We're in cutthroat competition with the Aetnas and Uniteds.").
'
02As noted above, modem statutes distinguish between member-owned mutual
companies and public benefit corporations. See supra note 37. Throughout most
of its life, however, the statutory structure governing Kentucky Blue obscured that
distinction. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 273.010-050 (Pre-
1970).
103 See Suit Moves Forward Following Anthem-Kentucky Blues Merger,
BEsTWIRE (May 17, 1999).
'04 See Attorney General's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler I v. Anthem
Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin Circuit Court,
Div. I (filed Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Attorney General's Response] at 4
("Feeling the effects of the Great Depression, the incorporators of Kentucky Blue
followed a national trend of establishing a Blue plan as the financing arm of
charitable hospitals.").
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pitals. °5 By developing a pre-paid medical plan, hospitals were assured a
steady stream of income and the public was able to pay for medical care on
an affordable basis."° Community rating and reimbursement for charity
care provided by participating hospitals further distinguished the Blues
from commercial insurers. 7
Thus, General Chandler argued, Kentucky Blue was founded by civic-
minded individuals and organizations who dedicated the results of their
efforts to the public good. The basic idea and capital might have resulted
in substantial profits to the founders, but by choosing to organize as a
nonprofit, the organizers eschewed any claim to the profits ofthe organiza-
tion.0 8 The action was brought to vindicate the intent of those founders that
the residual value of the organization continued to be devoted to a public
purpose."°9
The issue was never definitively resolved before the November 1999
settlement of the litigation, but following the court's denial of Anthem's
105 See CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 32, at 10.
[I]n the early 1930's-although tax-supported hospitals caring for veterans
and the indigent were fiul--occupancy rates at voluntary hospitals
nationwide had fallen to [fifty] percent, and before the end of the decade,
four hundred voluntary and for-profit hospitals went out of business. Those
wanting to survive had to act.
Id.
106 See Attorney General's Response, supra note 104, at 8.
107 See CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 32, at 31.
Most of the Plans offered the same rates to all subscriber groups regardless
of age, sex, occupation, or other characteristics that might affect the
frequency with which members of the group would require hospitalization.
Although this approach--to become known as "community rating"--was
equitable and administratively simple, it violated a long-established
insurance principle of tailoring rates to the risk potential of a subscriber
group.
Id.
108 See Attorney General's Response, supra note 104, at 8 ("There is over-
whelming evidence that the incorporators intended that Kentucky Blue hold its
assets for the benefit of the people of Kentucky, not private shareholders or
corporate officers.").
109 Despite Anthem's claims to the contrary, the Attorney General recognized
that the interests of Kentucky Blue's policyholders in maintaining adequate
reserves to cover medical claims enjoyed a higher priority than the Attorney
General's charitable trust claims. Thus the Attorney General sought return of the
residual value-the amountbywhich the value of Kentucky Blue's assets exceeded
assets required to pay present and future claims.
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preclusion defenses, discussed below, it was clear that the question would
dominate the trial of the case. The lack of clear statutory provisions
declaring that the assets of Kentucky Blue were held in charitable trust
created a riskthat the Attorney General would be unsuccessful in his claim.
Of course, this risk, coupled with the risk of a substantial award to the
Attorney General, prompted the parties to settle the case.
B. Anthem's Preclusion Defenses
Another aspect of the Anthem case tested the charitable trust doctrines
underlying General Chandler's suit. In a motion for summary judgement
filed near the end of the first year of the case, Anthem asserted that the
Attorney General was precluded from bringing a charitable trust claim by
three events in the corporate history of Kentucky Blue. First, Anthem
pointed to a 1953 tax decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court that Kentucky
Blue was not a "public charity" within the meaning of the Kentucky
Constitution. Second, Anthem asserted that a 1986 enactment by the
Kentucky General Assembly permitted the mutualization of Kentucky Blue
and that as a result of that change in corporate form, Kentucky Blue became
an entity owned by its policyholders and not the public. Finally, Anthem
claimed that a finding by the Kentucky Department of Insurance that the
1993 merger of Anthem and Kentucky Blue complied with the laws of the
Commonwealth estopped the Attorney General from bringing suit to
recover charitable assets.110
Anthem relied on an appeal to consistency in governmental pronounce-
ments. The Commonwealth, it argued, had denied Kentucky Blue a tax
exemption' based on the fact that it was never a charity, permitted its
conversion to a mutual insurance company which was owned by its
members,'" and approved the merger with Anthem Insurance as complying
with all applicable laws in a proceeding with all of the "essential features
ofatrial."" 3 These governmental determinations, Anthemclaimed, violated
"o See Garrett, supra note 100.
.See supra note 30 for a discussion of tax exempt status and conversions.
112 In 1986, the Kentucky legislature enacted K.R.S. § 304.32-045 which
provided a procedure under which Kentucky Blue could convert from a nonprofit
corporationto a mutual insurance corporation. After its 1986 conversion, Kentucky
Blue was clearly a member-owned mutual, that was operated for the benefit of its
members. K.R.S. § 304.32-180.
113 Anthem Memoranda, supra note 92, at 1-2.
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doctrines ofjudicial estoppel,1 4 resjudicata,' 15 collateral estoppel,' 6 equit-
able estoppel,' '7 and due process. 1 '8 Anthem characterized the action as an
unconstitutional attempt by the Commonwealth to "gain millions for the
public coffers.""19
General Chandler based his response on the basic compact that the
charitable trust doctrine represents. Since Kentucky Blue held assets in
charitable trust, only a court of competent jurisdiction could alter the
trust.' 20 The 1953 tax case in which Kentucky Blue was found not to be a
"purely public charity," addressed only the tax status of the organization
and did not purport to involve the charitable trust questions presented in the
litigation against Anthem. 121 Thus, no court had ever determined whether
Kentucky Blue held its assets in charitable trust.
The Attorney General argued further that neither the General Assem-
bly, in 1986, nor the Insurance Commissioner in 1993 had the authority to
permit the conversion of the charitable assets to a private use."2 General
Chandler relied on the principle that the state, as such, has no interest in the
property subject to the charitable trust. Thus, neither the legislative branch
nor the executive branch had a right to dispose of the property or permit the
conversion of the charitable trust. " In explaining this lack of authority, the
Attorney General argued that granting power to permit the conversion of
charitable assets to the General Assembly,2 4 the Insurance Commissioner
or the taxing authority "would so erode the public's confidence in the
integrity of charitable trusts as to make future charitable endeavors
difficult, if not impossible."1"
1 4 Id. at 19-20.
1"s Id. at 30-34.
16 Id. at 21-24.
117 Id. at 35-38.
"
8 Id. at 38-42.
119.1d. at 43.
"o See Attorney General's Response, supra note 104, at 19.21 d. at 22-26.
22Id. at 19.
123 See ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 20, § 348 ("it has been held that the
legislature has no power to destroy or vary the terms of a valid charitable trust!).
24 General Chandler characterized the 1986 mutualization of Kentucky Blue as
a mere change in the form of the organization. This change in form did not,
however, change the fact that Kentucky Blue held its residual value as of 1986 in
charitable trust nor did the operation of the mutual after 1986 convert charitable
assets to private use.
2 Attorney General's Response, supra note 104, at 19.
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General Chandler was supported by amicus curiae memoranda filed by
nineteen Kentucky charities,' 26 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,'27 and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC").'28 In addition
to providing both a national and local context for the litigation, the
Consumers Union Memorandum and Kentucky Amicus Brief made clear
that the purpose of the litigation was not to "confiscate" private assets for
government coffers, but rather that the litigation would ultimately result in
the creation of a foundation that would carry on the charitable purpose to
which the assets were devoted.'29 The NAIC Brief focused on the Kentucky
Insurance Commissioner's 1993 approval of the merger between Kentucky
Blue and Anthem, providing additional background on the role of state
insurance regulators in approving such transactions.
30
On May 5, 1999, Judge Roger Crittenden of the Franklin Circuit Court,
entered an order denying Anthem's motion for summary judgement and
permitting the case to proceed to trial on the question of whether Kentucky
26 Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General AlbertB. Chandler
II v. Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin
Circuit Court, Div. I (filed Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Kentucky Amicus Brief]
(filed by The American Association of Retired Persons (Kentucky State Legislative
Committee), Catholic Conference of Kentucky, Center for Accessible Living,
CommunityFarmAlliance, Hazard-Perry County CommunityMinistries, Homeless
and Housing Coalition of Kentucky, Justice and Peace Office (Diocese of
Covington), Kentucky Association of Regional Programs, Kentucky Council of
Churches, Kentucky Domestic Violence Association, Kentucky Psychological
Association, Kentucky Retired Teachers Association, Kentucky Task Force on
Hunger, Kentucky Youth Advocates, League of Women Voters of Kentucky,
Mental Health Association of Kentucky, Metro Human Needs Alliance, Sisters of
Charity of Nazareth Leadership Team, and Women's Crisis Center).
127Amicus Curiae Consumers Union ofU.S., Inc's Memorandum in Response
to Defendants' Summary Judgement Motion, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney
General Albert B. Chandler I v. Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin Circuit Court, Div. I (filed Sept 18, 1998)
[hereinafter Consumers Union Memorandum].
128 BriefofNational Association ofInsurance Commissioners as Amicus Curiae
in Support of the Kentucky Attorney General and the Kentucky Department of
Insurance, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General Albert B. Chandler I v.
Anthem Ins. Cos., No. 97-CI-01566, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin Circuit
Court, Div. I (filed Sept 18, 1998) [hereinafter NAIC Brief].
... See Consumers Union Memorandum, supra note 127, at 9-10; Kentucky
Amicus Brief, supra note 126, at 15-17.
'
30NAIC Brief, supra note 128, at 13-21.
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Blue held charitable assets."' During a regular status meeting in November
of 1999, the court ordered the parties to attempt to mediate a settlement of
the matter, appointing former Kentucky Senator and Supreme Court Justice
Walter Baker as mediator. After two days of negotiations, the parties
entered into an Agreement of Understanding, agreeing to settle the case for
$45 million and setting in motion the process under which the Foundation
for a Healthy Kentucky would be formed.
C. Protecting Charitable Assets Without a Statutory Framework
The Anthem litigation illustrates the importance of a carefully
conceived statutory framework to regulate nonprofit conversions. The
absence of such legislation made the scope of the assets subject to the
charitable trust unclear.' It also created difficult issues regarding the
interplay between the common law of charitable trust and the insurance
regulations governing Kentucky Blue following its 1986 mutualization.'33
Perhaps more importantly, the absence of a conversion statute put the
Attorney General into the posture of litigating the charitable trust issues
only after the 1993 merger had been consummated. The Kentucky
Insurance Commissioner was the only state official with explicit statutory
authority to examine the merger at the time it was approved. Predictably,
the only issues raised during the merger approval process concerned the
effect on Kentucky Blue as an insurer. Thus, the focus of the merger
approval hearings was on the effect of the merger on Kentucky policyhold-
ers.
Of course, it is much more difficult to recover assets lost in a consum-
mated transaction than to protect those assets in the merger process.
Conversion legislation providing the Attorney General with approval
authority would have better assured that all of the charitable assets were
accounted for and that the merger agreement would have provided compen-
131 Anthem Order, supra note 93, at 2 ("It is the Attorney General's burden to
demonstrate both the existence of the trust and the amount of assets.").
132 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
133 KR.S. § 304.24-180(1) provided that a mutual insurance company is
"owned by and shall be operated in the interests of its members," This provision
granted the members an equity interest in the company that must be satisfied if the
company converted to a stockinsurer, KR.S. § 304.24-380, ora liquidation, KR.S.
§ 304.24-440(1). These provisions raised questions regarding the proper way to
calculate the value of the charitable trust and the relative priority of the charitable
obligation and the members ownership interest.
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sation for those assets. Such a framework would have vitiated the claims of
unfairness and inconsistency that permeated Anthem's case.
Rather than heed the lessons of the Anthem litigation, the Kentucky
General Assembly further clouded the difficult issues surrounding
ownership and control of charitable assets when it enacted House Bill 629.
As-originally introduced, House Bill 629 would have required the $45
million proceeds of the Anthem case to be paid over to the state for
appropriation by the legislature. 3 The section seeking control over these
proceeds was removed from the bill but the Foundation formed by the
settlement was declared a "public trust" and subjected to provisions
requiring compliance with the state's open meetings and open records
laws, '3 annual audits by the State Auditor of Public Accounts,'36 and
reports to a committee of the General Assembly prior to the foundation's
disbursement of funds.'37
House Bill 629 also requires future recoveries of charitable assets to be
handed over to a newly formed Charitable Assets Administration Board.'
This quasi-governmental body'39 is charged with the obligation of holding
and administering the charitable assets 4' and preserving the "identity
character and nature" of the charitable funds consistent with the documents,
laws, and court orders that govern the funds.
14 1
"' See Michael Quinlan, House Leaders Won't Seek Control of $45 Million
Anthem Settlement, COURIER JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 14, 2000, at A7;
Monica Richardson, Anthem Settlement Disputed: Attorney General, Legislators
Fight over Control ofMoney, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb.
10, 2000, at Al.
'
35 K.R.S. § 48.005(3)(a) (Michie Supp. 2001).
I36 d. § (3)(c).
137 Id. § (3)(f). The statute provides only that the Interim Joint Committee on
Appropriations and revenue may hold a hearing and make findings concerning
whether the disbursement is "consistent with the nature, character and purpose for
which the funds were recovered" and "in the best interest of the Commonwealth."
Id. The committee has no power to approve or deny approval of the disbursement.
See id.
'
31 Id. § (4). The author currently serves as a member of the Charitable Assets
Administration Board.
139 The Charitable Assets Administration Board members are appointed by the
Governor, the Attorney General, and the Auditor of Public Accounts and are
subject to confirmation by the Senate. Id. § (4)(a).
'
4
'See id. § (4).
,4, Id. § (4)(f).
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House Bill 629 was roundly criticized by General Chandler142 and over
forty consumer and philanthropic organizations."' The principal criticism
is that the bill attempts to wrest control over charitable assets from the
courts, which had previously exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
charitable assets. The transfer of control from the courts to the Charitable
Assets Administration Board, coupled with references in the bill to the
"public" nature of the funds, violates the basic compact that charitable trust
law represents.
As noted earlier, charitable trust law can be thought of as creating a
compact between the state and individuals and organizations who donate
time, ideas, and money to philanthropic endeavors. In exchange for
donations to worthy efforts, the state agrees to preserve the essential
character of the charitable assets-preventing those assets from inuring to
the benefit of private individuals. The deal would be incomplete, however,
if the fruits of the donors' efforts were subjected to the vagaries of the
political process. No less a political theorist than Chief Justice John
Marshall recognized this fundamental truth when he wrote:
It is probable, that no man ever was, and that no man ever will be, the
founder of a college, believing at the time, that an act of incorporation
constitutes no security for the institution; believing, that it is immediately
to be deemed a public institution, whose funds are to be governed and
applied, not by the will of the donor, but by the will of the legislature.'"
House Bill 629, by placing control of charitable funds with a quasi-
governmental organization, presents at least the potential for erosion of the
compact the state has traditionally made with donors.1 45
142 See Charles Wolfe, Chandler to Seek Veto of Charitable Asset Bill, COURIER
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 31, 2000, at B6. I have also criticized the
provisions of HB 629, see Christopher W. Frost, Court Righyul Overseer of
Anthem Trust Funds, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 21,
2000), at A13, and appeared with General Chandler at a March 22, 2000 Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing considering the bill.
143 Consumers Union, Blue Cross, Blue Shield Conversion Update, available
at http://www.consumersunion.org/health/bcbs-update9ol/htm (visited Jan. 16,
2002).
14 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 647 (1819).
145 This abrogation of the courts' jurisdiction over charitable funds raises ser-
ious questions about the constitutionality of the statute under the state separation
of powers doctrine, KY. CONST. §§ 27-28, and unjust takings provisions, id. §§
3, 13. Perhaps recognizing these difficulties, the General Assembly included
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III. COMMUNITY BASED CYPRES:
THE CREATION OF THE FOUNDATION FOR A HEALTHY KENTUCKY
The Definitive Settlement Agreement in the Anthem litigation called
for the creation of a new foundation to hold the $45 million proceeds of the
settlement in trust to address the unmet health care needs of Kentucky
citizens. At the press conference announcing the settlement, General
Chandler made clear that the formation of the new foundation would be
accomplished with the help of a broad based advisory committee of
Kentucky citizens appointed by Judge Crittenden, with the advice of
Senator Walter Baker, the court-appointed mediator who facilitated the
settlement. Thus began the difficult, but much less contentious, process of
redeploying the charitable trust fund into a related use.
In a letter to Judge Crittenden, Scott White, Robert Gray, and David
Kaplan of the Office of the Attorney General outlined the procedure to
establish what would ultimately become the Foundation for a Healthy
an unprecedented provision in the statute which provision precludes any state-
wide constitutional officer or any other state official or agency from participating
in any suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute. K.R.S. § 48.005(8)
provides:
Notwithstanding any statute or common law to the contrary, and except as
provided in this subsection, an elected statewide constitutional officer or
any other state official or agency shall not file or participate as a plaintiff,
petitioner, party, intervening party, attorney, or amicus curiae in any
litigation challenging the constitutionality of this section. State funds and
employee time shall not be expended by any person or agency in support of
such a challenge. If the constitutionality of this section is challenged, the
Finance and Administration Cabinet shall be the sole named respondent in
that litigation, and shall consult with the Legislative Research Commission
regarding defense of that litigation.
House Bill 629 also included provisions that erode the authority of the Attorney
General to apply proceeds of other types of cases to rectify the harms that gave rise
to the litigation. For example, the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, K.R.S. §§
367.110 - .300 grants the Attorney General standing to bring actions to recover
damages for violations of the Act. K.R.S. § 48.005(5) provides that any funds
recovered by judgment or settlement of a suit brought on behalf of the
Commonwealth must be held in a state account and may be disbursed only on
specific legislative appropriation. Id. § (5)(b). This provision applies to public and
private funds unless the recovery was sought and received for specific individuals
identified as parties to the action. Id. § (7).
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Kentucky.1" The letter discussed the background research and planning
that the Office of the Attorney General had undertaken and provided a five
phase plan for the creation of the new independent Foundation.147
General Chandler's plan provided that the Kentucky Charitable Health
Care Trust Advisory Committee (the "Advisory Committee") would be
composed of twenty-five to thirty persons with a broad range of expertise
and including a significant proportion of consumer advocates. The
Advisory Committee would also include three members appointed (one
each) by the Governor, the Speaker of the Kentucky House of Representa-
tives, and the President of the Kentucky Senate."' The Office of the
Attorney General provided staffing for the Advisory Committee, paid for
out of agency funds, 49 but otherwise permitted the Advisory Committee
free reign to create the Foundation. The broad citizen involvement was an
important feature of the process under which the Foundation was created,
insuring freedom from political influence. In addition, Judge Crittenden
retained jurisdiction over the funds, thereby assuring continued judicial
supervision over the work of the Advisory Committee.
In an effort to ensure that the Foundation would incorporate the best
practices of similar foundations around the country, the Attorney General's
office solicited the assistance of national experts on charitable conversion
foundations from Consumers Union, Community Catalyst, Grantmakers in
Health, and the Ford Foundation. Representatives of these organizations
attended the meetings of the Advisory Committee and provided substantial
technical assistance in both the definition of the Foundation's mission and
its governance.
From the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, a clear consensus
developed around the idea that the Foundation should direct its efforts
toward health policy analysis and advocacy. As everyone recognized, $45
million, while a substantial sum, would not last long if the money were
used on the provision of medical services. By creating a foundation with a
health policy mission, the Committee believed that the funds would have
146 Letter from Scott White, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Robert Gray,
Executive Director, Office of Rate Intervention, and David A. Kaplan, Assistant
Attorney General, to Judge Roger L. Crittenden, Franklin Circuit Court (Aug. 7,
2000) (copy on file with author).
" The plan included: 1) Formation of the Advisory Committee; 2) Operation
of the Advisory Committee; 3) Court Approval; 4)Appointrnent of the Initial
Board; and 5) Initial Meeting of the Advisory Committee. Id. at 3-7.
148 Id. at3.
149Id. at 6.
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a more lasting impact on the citizens of the Commonwealth. 5 ' The
Advisory Committee recommended that that mission be implemented
through grants of $1,000,000 each to the University of Kentucky and the
University of Louisville to endow chairs in health policy.' These grants,
which were matched by a state financed fund, would provide the resources
with which the universities could hire health policy scholars to further
assist in the policy agenda of the Foundation.
The focus on health policy also provided a better fit with the original
charitable purpose of the founders of Kentucky Blue. Kentucky Blue was
created with a broad goal of providing a mechanism for pre-paid medical
care and a financing device for charitable hospitals.'52 As such, the
founders appear to have been interested in promoting the health of the
citizens of the Commonwealth-not through charitable provision of
services, but rather through private financing, education of the public, and
support of the health care infrastructure. By preserving the funds and
devoting the investment income to health care policy, the Committee
assured that the charitable assets would continue to be devoted to promot-
ing the health of the citizens of Kentucky generally, rather than that of a
single group of individuals.
In addition to its work on the Foundation's mission, the Advisory
Committee also developed the basic structure that would govern the
Foundation in the future. The Committee drafted articles of incorporation
and bylaws for the Foundation that would continue the state-wide focus and
community-based orientation that characterized the Advisory Committee
itself. The articles provided that the Foundation would be governed by a
fifteen member board comprised of members from across the state.153 The
'
50 The Articles of Incorporation of the Foundation set forth its generalpurposes
as follows: "To make grants, contributions and program-related investments, and
sponsor orparticipate in activities, designed to address the unmet health care needs
of Kentuckians by developing and influencing health policy, improving access to
care, reducing health risks and disparities, and promoting health equity. . ..-
Articles of Incorporation, Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky (filed with the
Kentucky Secretary of State on May 8, 2001), at Art. II(a)(i) (copy on file with
author).
" See id. at Art. II (a)(iii).
152,See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text for a discussion on the goals
of Kentucky Blue.
153 The Bylaws of the Foundation provide that the fifteen member board of
directors include two members appointed by the Governor and one member
appointed by Anthem. The gubernatorial appointments were the result of H.B. 629,
see supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text, and the Anthem appointment was
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Community Advisory Committee continued in existence to assure
continued community involvement in the affairs of the Foundation and
board accountability to the citizens of the state. The board also developed
and approved investment and financial policies to assure good stewardship
of the funds.
Although the Foundation is just beginning its work, its formation
provides a good example of how a carefully crafted and transparent process
can accomplish the difficult task of applying cypres to charitable assets.
Once the contentious task of recovering the charitable assets was accom-
plished, the Community Advisory Committee provided a deliberative body
that had substantial experience in health care and charitable assets
administration to advise the court regarding the mission and structure of the
new Foundation. The court's retention of jurisdiction over the fund
provided further assurance to philanthropically minded individuals that the
state will adhere to its end of the bargain. In the end, the Foundation for a
Healthy Kentucky is likely to carry out the general intentions of the
founders of Kentucky Blue while serving as a positive force for health care
policy in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
CONCLUSION
Continued change in the health care industry is assured as technology
progresses, costs skyrocket and the population ages. Not only will these
specific changes provide continuing challenges to public health officials,
but they will also continue to put pressure on health care institutions'
ability to make their traditional contributions to the health of the popula-
tion.
While most people can agree on the basic notion that public health is,
and should continue to be, an essential function of government, it cannot
be doubted that nonprofit organizations provide both funding and infra-
provided by the agreement settling the case.
The remaining twelve directors are elected by the Board from nominees
provided by the Community Advisory Committee and must be residents of
Kentucky with knowledge, expertise and skills in health care policy, the delivery
of health care services, and health care finance. These individuals, who must
include consumer representatives, are drawn from each ofthe seven Supreme Court
districts in the Commonwealth (one each) with five members serving at large. The
mechanism for filling board vacancies was carefully chosen to insure continued
community involvement in the affairs of the foundation. See Bylaws, Foundation
for a Healthy Kentucky (copy on file with author).
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structure necessary to the health of the population. The unregulated
conversion of those organizations from nonprofit to for-profit organizations
poses a substantial threat to the provision of those services while, at the
same time, creating an environment in which charitable donation and work
is less attractive to people. Conversion transactions, therefore, have serious
implications for public health advocates.
States have taken an interest in addressing the issues that nonprofit
conversions raise. Through application of charitable trust doctrines, state
Attorneys General have recovered billions of dollars in charitable assets
released through nonprofit conversions. As illustrated in the case study of
the Anthem litigation in Kentucky, however, the application of these
ancient legal principles is fraught with difficulty.
Much of the difficulty is attributable to the confusion surrounding the
application of charitable trust law to modem commercial nonprofits. These
organizations bear little resemblance to the types of charitable entities the
law was developed to protect. Properly understood, however, conversion
transactions can be regulated in ways that permit the capture of the
transaction proceeds and the rededication of those proceeds to their
intended purpose. Nonprofit conversion statutes provide a frameworkunder
which courts and Attorneys General can participate in the conversion
process to assure the continued protection of charitable assets while
applying those assets to the challenges of maintaining and promoting
health.
